The case for biotechnological exceptionalism.

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Medical Ethics
• Philosophy of Medicine

Background:

• A growing number of scholars argue against 'biomedical exceptionalism,' asserting that biomedical enhancements do not warrant distinct moral consideration compared to non-biomedical enhancements.
• This perspective suggests that differentiating between biomedical and non-biomedical interventions on moral grounds is an unjustified stance.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically examine the arguments against biomedical exceptionalism.
• To vindicate the established view that biomedical enhancement presents unique moral concerns.
• To identify specific moral issues raised by biomedical interventions that are less relevant in non-biomedical contexts.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of the argumentative strategies employed by proponents of biomedical exceptionalism.
• Development of counterexamples to illustrate the distinct moral considerations associated with biomedical interventions.
• Comparative analysis of moral concerns in biomedical versus non-biomedical interventions.

Main Results:

• The article demonstrates that the arguments against biomedical exceptionalism are flawed.
• Counterexamples reveal that biomedical interventions introduce moral concerns not typically found in non-biomedical interventions.
• A key finding is that issues of informed consent are consistently raised by biomedical interventions, a concern rarely paralleled in non-biomedical contexts.

Conclusions:

• Biomedical enhancement does indeed raise specific moral concerns that warrant distinct consideration.
• The concept of biomedical exceptionalism is defended against recent critiques.
• The unique moral landscape of biomedical interventions, particularly concerning informed consent, necessitates careful ethical evaluation.