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Twin pregnancy reduction is not an 'all or nothing' problem: a response to Räsänen
Dunja Begović1, Elizabeth Chloe Romanis2, E J Verweij3
1Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK dunja.begovic@manchester.ac.uk.
Journal of Medical Ethics
|June 29, 2021
Summary
This study critiques the application of Horton's "all or nothing" problem to twin pregnancy reduction. It argues that aborting one fetus is not inherently wrong, thus the ethical dilemma doesn't apply.
Area of Science:
- Medical Ethics
- Reproductive Ethics
- Fetal Reduction
Background:
- Horton's 'all or nothing' problem presents an ethical paradox involving saving lives.
- Räsänen applied this problem to multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR) from twins to a singleton (2-to-1 MFPR).
- Räsänen concluded that in non-medically indicated cases, women should carry both fetuses to term.
Purpose of the Study:
- To challenge Räsänen's argument regarding the ethics of 2-to-1 MFPR.
- To demonstrate that the 'all or nothing' problem is not applicable to this specific scenario.
- To highlight the unrealistic nature of Räsänen's ethical framework in clinical practice.
Main Methods:
- Ethical analysis of Horton's 'all or nothing' problem.
- Critique of Räsänen's application of the problem to 2-to-1 MFPR.
- Examination of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR.
Main Results:
- Räsänen's argument lacks sufficient support for the claim that aborting one twin is morally wrong.
- The 'all or nothing' ethical problem does not arise in the context of 2-to-1 MFPR.
- The hypothetical scenario used by Räsänen is unrealistic for clinical decision-making.
Conclusions:
- The ethical framework presented by Räsänen is not applicable to 2-to-1 MFPR due to flawed premises.
- The clinical realities of MFPR necessitate a different ethical approach than the one proposed.
- The argument's limited applicability to real-world decisions in reproductive ethics is highlighted.

