Twofold effect of self-interest in pedestrian room evacuation

Evacuation dynamics of pedestrians in a square room with one exit is studied. The movement of the pedestrians is guided by the static floor field model. Whenever multiple pedestrians are trying to move to the same target position, a game theoretical framework is introduced to address the conflict. Depending on the payoff matrix, the game that the pedestrians are involved in may be either hawk-dove or prisoner's dilemma, from which the reaped payoffs determine the capacities, or probabilities, of the pedestrians occupying the preferred vacant sites. The pedestrians are allowed to adjust their strategies when competing with others, and a parameter κ is utilized to characterize the extent of their self-interest. It is found that self-interest may induce either positive or negative impacts on the evacuation dynamics depending on whether it can facilitate the formation of collective cooperation in the population or not. Particularly, a resonance-like performance of evacuation is realized in the regime of prisoner's dilemma. The effects of placing an obstacle in front of the exit and the diversity of responses of the pedestrians to the space competition on the evacuation dynamics are also discussed.