Folk Moral Objectivism: The Case of Harmful Actions

Area of Science:

• Moral Psychology
• Experimental Philosophy
• Social Cognition

Background:

• The objectivity of moral beliefs, particularly concerning harmful actions, remains a subject of debate.
• Previous research suggested people adopt non-objectivist stances when encountering differing cultural or species perspectives on moral issues.
• A deflationary hypothesis posits objectivism regarding harmful actions perceived as unjust.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate claims of non-objectivism in moral judgments.
• To test the deflationary hypothesis concerning objectivism in beliefs about the wrongness of harmful actions.
• To address methodological limitations in prior studies on cultural and species differences in moral objectivism.

Main Methods:

• Replication of previous findings with added measures to probe participant assumptions (Study 1).
• Modification of experimental designs to mitigate confounds related to understanding and capacity (Studies 2 & 3).
• Direct manipulation of perceived injustice to assess its effect on objectivist responding (Studies 4a & 4b).

Main Results:

• Initial replication confirmed previous results but follow-up measures suggested methodological limitations.
• Revised experimental designs, controlling for understanding and capacity, yielded high rates of objectivism.
• Manipulating perceptions of injustice strongly correlated with objectivist responses, supporting the deflationary hypothesis.

Conclusions:

• Prior evidence for non-objectivism in moral judgments was likely influenced by methodological artifacts.
• People exhibit strong objectivist tendencies regarding the wrongness of harmful actions when injustice is perceived.
• The findings robustly support the deflationary hypothesis, underscoring the role of perceived injustice in moral objectivism.