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Updated: Aug 14, 2026

Peering into the Dynamics of Social Interactions: Measuring Play Fighting in Rats
Published on: January 18, 2013
Behavior-dependent contexts for repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma: II. Dynamical aspects of the evolution of
1Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, CA 94305.
Abstract:
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma models are proposed in which, at any trial, the probability of staying in the game depends on the outcome of the previous trial. If a player's choice depends on its own play (cooperate or defect) at the previous trial, it becomes possible for cooperative strategies to increase when rare in a population of egoists. A dynamic analysis is used to demonstrate that stable polymorphisms may result, and may involve more strategies than just Tit-for-Tat and all-Defect. The tendency for clustering among like strategists to enhance their initial increase when rare is also explored dynamically.
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