Can the Future-Like-Ours Argument Survive Ontological Scrutiny?

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Biology
• Bioethics
• Metaphysics

Background:

• The future-like-ours (FLO) argument is a prominent objection to abortion.
• This argument posits that a fetus has a right to its future conscious experiences.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically examine the metaphysical assumptions underlying the FLO argument.
• To demonstrate that the FLO argument necessitates a commitment to ontic vagueness.
• To propose an alternative ethical framework for abortion that avoids controversial metaphysics.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Examination of the logical structure of the FLO argument.
• Comparative analysis of metaphysical commitments in ethical theories.

Main Results:

• The FLO argument implicitly assumes ontic vagueness regarding the status of early fetuses.
• This reliance on ontic vagueness is problematic due to its controversial nature.
• An ethical justification for prohibiting abortion can be established independently of such metaphysical assumptions.
• The metaphysical underpinnings are unnecessary for explaining the wrongness of killing conscious humans.

Conclusions:

• The FLO argument's reliance on ontic vagueness makes it an ad hoc justification for opposing abortion.
• Alternative ethical frameworks can adequately address the moral status of fetuses without invoking complex metaphysics.
• Ethical considerations for abortion should focus on demonstrable properties rather than disputed metaphysical claims.