GNSS Spoofing Detection Based on Coupled Visual/Inertial/GNSS Navigation System

Area of Science:

• Robotics and Autonomous Systems
• Navigation and Positioning
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are critical for unmanned vehicles (UVs) but vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
• Spoofing can severely damage navigation systems, particularly for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).
• Existing coupled visual/inertial/GNSS systems remain susceptible to GNSS spoofing.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel method for detecting GNSS spoofing attacks.
• To enhance the resilience of navigation systems for UVs against spoofing.
• To ensure continuous and reliable positioning even during spoofing events.

Main Methods:

• Development of a coupled visual/inertial/GNSS positioning algorithm.
• Monitoring deviations between visual inertial odometry (VIO) and GNSS within an optimization framework.
• Utilizing a modified Chi-square test for spoofing detection and alarm triggering.
• Modifying optimal estimation algorithms to mitigate spoofed GNSS data.

Main Results:

• The proposed method effectively detects GNSS spoofing attacks.
• The system demonstrates efficiency even when spoofing-induced deviations are minimal.
• Real-world experiments validate the performance of the spoofing detection and mitigation strategy.
• The modified optimal estimation algorithm successfully continues positioning during spoofing.

Conclusions:

• The developed method provides a robust solution for GNSS spoofing detection in coupled navigation systems.
• This approach significantly improves the security and reliability of navigation for GNSS-dependent unmanned vehicles.
• The technique offers a promising way to maintain navigation integrity against sophisticated cyber threats.