Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Social Psychology
• Action Theory

Background:

• Collective intention theories often define shared intentions through individual mental states.
• Quasi-psychologism posits that collective intentions are constituted by individual participatory intentions.
• Common intuitions suggest norms of communication within collective actions.

Purpose of the Study:

• To identify a problem for quasi-psychological views of collective intention.
• To examine the tension between metaphysical commitments of these views and experimental findings on collective action norms.
• To explore potential responses for quasi-psychologists.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation analyzing metaphysical commitments.
• Conceptual analysis of collective intention and its persistence conditions.
• Engagement with experimental research on interpersonal normativity in collective action.

Main Results:

• Quasi-psychological views entail persistence conditions that conflict with the obligation to notify co-actors.
• This conflict challenges the adequacy of reducing collective intentions solely to individual mental states.
• Experimental data on the norm of notification highlights a gap in quasi-psychological explanations.

Conclusions:

• Quasi-psychologism faces a significant challenge in accounting for the interpersonal normativity of collective action.
• The findings suggest a need to revise or reject views that exclusively rely on individual mental states for collective intentions.
• Further research is needed to develop alternative accounts or refine existing quasi-psychological theories.