A CAN-Bus Lightweight Authentication Scheme

Area of Science:

• Automotive Cybersecurity
• In-Vehicle Networking
• Embedded Systems Security

Background:

• The Controller Area Network (CAN bus) architecture lacks inherent security features, making it vulnerable to various cyberattacks.
• Existing security solutions often modify CAN bus frame transmission, increasing computational load and compromising real-time performance.
• Attacks such as eavesdropping, replay, spoofing, and denial-of-service pose significant risks to driving safety.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel method addressing both security vulnerabilities and compatibility issues in CAN bus systems.
• To enhance the security of CAN bus communications against common attack vectors without disrupting existing protocols.
• To provide a solution that maintains the delay guarantee feature crucial for real-time control applications.

Main Methods:

• Implementation of simple and efficient frame authentication algorithms to detect and prevent unauthorized frame modifications.
• Development of a security enhancement compatible with both the original CAN bus and the CAN with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD) protocols.
• Focus on minimizing computational overhead to ensure compatibility and maintain performance characteristics.

Main Results:

• The proposed method effectively prevents spoofing and replay attacks through robust frame authentication.
• Compatibility with both CAN bus and CAN-FD protocols is achieved, allowing for seamless integration.
• The solution demonstrates a lower operand count compared to existing security enhancement methods, indicating improved efficiency.

Conclusions:

• The developed method offers a viable solution to enhance CAN bus security without sacrificing performance or compatibility.
• This approach contributes to improving the overall safety and integrity of electronic control unit communications in vehicles.
• The efficiency and compatibility make it a practical choice for securing current and future automotive networks.