Do "knowledge attributions" involve metarepresentation just like belief attributions do?
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Updated: Oct 12, 2025

The Modified Temptation Resistance Task: A Paradigm to Elicit Children's Strategic Lie-telling
Published on: April 6, 2018
Rachel Dudley1, Ágnes Melinda Kovács1
1Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Oktober 6 u. 7, 1051, Hungary. dudleyr@ceu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rachelelainedudley; kovacsag@ceu.eduhttps://people.ceu.edu/agnes-melinda_kovacs.
Abstract:
The authors distinguish knowledge and belief attributions, emphasizing the role of the former in mental-state attribution. This does not, however, warrant diminishing interest in the latter. Knowledge attributions may not entail mental-state attributions or metarepresentations. Even if they do, the proposed features are insufficient to distinguish them from belief attributions, demanding that we first understand each underlying representation.
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