The enactive naturalization of normativity: from self-maintenance to situated interactions

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Biology

Background:

• The autopoietic enactive account links normativity to life's self-maintenance.
• This framework suggests continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms based on agent identity.
• Challenges arise in explaining non-individual norms and social interactions detached from self-constitution.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address limitations in autopoietic enactivism regarding social normativity.
• To propose an alternative conception of normativity grounded in Wittgensteinian pragmatics.
• To differentiate between an agent's normative viewpoint and external normative criteria.

Main Methods:

• Critically examining the autopoietic enactive account of normativity.
• Developing a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic theory of meaning.
• Distinguishing between individual normative viewpoints and external normative criteria.

Main Results:

• Normativity is reconceptualized as interactions evaluated by external criteria, not solely self-maintenance.
• This distinction allows for genuine social interactions and habit acquisition independent of individual constitution.
• The proposed framework potentially explains the situated and relational nature of agency.

Conclusions:

• The revised notion of normativity resolves challenges in explaining social interactions and non-individual norms.
• Separating external normative criteria from agent self-constitution offers a more robust account of agency.
• This approach bridges individual and social normativity, enhancing understanding of embodied cognition.