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Neighborhood size effects on the evolution of cooperation under myopic dynamics
Juan Shi1, Jinzhuo Liu2, Matjaž Perc3
1School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi 710072, China.
Abstract:
We study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 social dilemma games in which players are located on a two-dimensional square lattice. During the evolution, each player modifies her strategy by means of myopic update dynamic to maximize her payoff while composing neighborhoods of different sizes, which are characterized by the corresponding radius, r. An investigation of the sublattice-ordered spatial structure for different values of r reveals that some patterns formed by cooperators and defectors can help the former to survive, even under untoward conditions. In contrast to individuals who resist the invasion of defectors by forming clusters due to network reciprocity, innovators spontaneously organize a socially divisive structure that provides strong support for the evolution of cooperation and advances better social systems.
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