First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroscience
• Cognitive Science

Background:

• Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a prominent causal structure theory of consciousness.
• The Unfolding Argument (UA) previously challenged IIT and similar theories, facing significant criticism.
• A central debate concerns whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, can ground consciousness theories.

Purpose of the Study:

• To argue that pure first-person experience is an insufficient scientific foundation for IIT.
• To demonstrate that IIT cannot be empirically tested as a theory of consciousness.
• To address criticisms of the Unfolding Argument and elucidate deeper issues with IIT.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and logical analysis.
• Examination of the requirements for scientific theories, including measurability and data-driven validation.
• Critique of the foundational axioms and implications of IIT.

Main Results:

• Pure first-person experience is not scientifically measurable without reliance on reports or physiological data.
• Science requires data-backed theories, not assertions of ground truth independent of empirical evidence.
• Experiments based on third-person data cannot adequately test IIT as a theory of consciousness.

Conclusions:

• IIT's conception of consciousness is dissociated from measurable phenomena, rendering it epiphenomenal.
• The theory implies that consciousness lacks causal power, contradicting its own axiomatic foundation.
• IIT and related causal structure theories may explain aspects of cognition but not consciousness itself, potentially leading to self-contradiction.