Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Area of Science:

• Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind
• Cognitive Science

Background:

• Cerebral energy limits neuronal processing to changes, creating a temporally discontinuous neural world.
• This contrasts with the continuous phenomenal experience of consciousness.
• Fundamental physical equations also rely on temporal change and integration.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a hypothesis explaining the source of consciousness's incomprehensibility.
• To link phenomenal time-constant entities to the integration of neuronal change data.
• To explore the role of qualia and attention in phenomenal perception.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical hypothesis formulation.
• Analysis of the relationship between neuronal activity and phenomenal experience.
• Examination of experimental evidence, including change blindness and inattentive perception.

Main Results:

• Consciousness phenomenally "fills-in" time-constant entities via integration, despite neuronal data existing only for changes.
• Qualia act as necessary "initial conditions" for this integration.
• Brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting phenomenal content.

Conclusions:

• The introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities through integration is a primary source of consciousness's incomprehensibility.
• Understanding integration and qualia is key to understanding consciousness.
• Inattentive perception offers unique insights into the relationship between neuronal processing and subjective experience.