Laying ghosts to rest

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Metaphysics
• Consciousness Studies

Background:

• Physicalism faces challenges from arguments based on conceivability, such as the zombie argument.
• Philip Goff has proposed anti-physicalist arguments utilizing the conceivability of 'ghosts'—entities whose existence is solely consciousness.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate the conceivability of ghosts and its implications for physicalism.
• To determine if the conceivability of ghosts provides a reliable basis for arguing against physicalism, both a priori and a posteriori.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of arguments concerning the conceivability of ghosts.
• Drawing on existing work on conceivability and its relation to possibility (Kung, O'Conaill).
• Examination of how the ability to stipulate conditions in conceivability scenarios affects the inference to metaphysical possibility.

Main Results:

• Ghosts are indeed conceivable.
• The cognitive mechanisms enabling the conception of ghosts (stipulation) do not guarantee their metaphysical possibility.
• The conceivability of ghosts undermines its reliability as a guide to possibility.

Conclusions:

• While the conceivability of ghosts challenges a priori physicalism, it does not necessarily refute a posteriori physicalism.
• The argument suggests that physicalists, particularly a posteriori physicalists, need not be concerned by the ghost argument.