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Updated: Sep 29, 2025

Perspectives on Neuroscience
Published on: July 31, 2007
Functional theories can describe many features of conscious phenomenology but cannot account for its existence
1Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, LondonSE14 6NW, UK. m.velmans@gold.ac.ukhttps://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/.
Abstract:
Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf argue persuasively that integrated information is not identical to or sufficient for consciousness, and that projective geometries more closely formalize the spatial features of conscious phenomenology. However, these too are not identical to or sufficient for consciousness. Although such third-person specifiable functional theories can describe the many forms of consciousness, they cannot account for its existence.
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