Might pain be experienced in the brainstem rather than in the cerebral cortex?

It is nearly axiomatic that pain, among other examples of conscious experience, is an outcome of still-uncertain forms of neural processing that occur in the cerebral cortex, and specifically within thalamo-cortical networks. This belief rests largely on the dramatic relative expansion of the cortex in the course of primate evolution, in humans in particular, and on the fact that direct activation of sensory representations in the cortex evokes a corresponding conscious percept. Here we assemble evidence, drawn from a number of sources, suggesting that pain experience is unlike the other senses and may not, in fact, be an expression of cortical processing. These include the virtual inability to evoke pain by cortical stimulation, the rarity of painful auras in epileptic patients and outcomes of cortical lesions. And yet, pain perception is clearly a function of a conscious brain. Indeed, it is perhaps the most archetypical example of conscious experience. This draws us to conclude that conscious experience, at least as realized in the pain system, is seated subcortically, perhaps even in the "primitive" brainstem. Our conjecture is that the massive expansion of the cortex over the course of evolution was not driven by the adaptive value of implementing consciousness. Rather, the cortex evolved because of the adaptive value of providing an already existing subcortical generator of consciousness with a feed of critical information that requires the computationally intensive capability of the cerebral cortex.