Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Industrial Organization

Background:

• Tullock contests are widely used models to study rent-seeking and resource allocation.
• Endogenous timing introduces strategic considerations regarding the timing of actions, influencing outcomes.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the timing decisions of players in a three-player Tullock contest with endogenous timing.
• To investigate how player asymmetries affect the chosen timing of effort exertion.

Main Methods:

• The study employs a theoretical model of a three-player Tullock contest.
• Players independently and simultaneously choose between two discrete time points to exert effort.
• Subsequent effort levels are chosen at the announced times.

Main Results:

• When player asymmetries are moderate, all players strategically announce the first available time point.
• Consequently, all players exert effort simultaneously in the first period.
• This outcome contrasts with findings in two-player asymmetric contests.

Conclusions:

• The endogenous timing framework reveals a tendency towards simultaneous action in three-player Tullock contests under moderate asymmetry.
• Player interactions and asymmetries significantly shape strategic timing decisions in contest models.