A tripartite evolutionary game study on green governance in China's coating industry

As a polluting industry, the green transformation of coatings is highly concerned by the Chinese government. In order to explore the role of government in the process of green transformation of coating industry, this paper constructs a green governance evolutionary game model of "government-manufacturing companies-application companies," and the complex interaction mechanism among the three parties is studied. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the asymptotic stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies of the equilibrium point of the tripartite game in the three stages of green governance in the coating industry (traditional technology-green transformation-collaborative governance). Finally, the model was verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of the changes of subjective parameters on the evolutionary game was discussed. The results show that (1) the intensity of government governance is related to the frequency of spot checks and punishment coefficients, and the evolution tends to be balanced when the intensity of governance is moderate. (2) The evolutionary trend of the game's main players' strategy selection also depends on the government's punishment. There is greater probability of green transition of manufacturing companies under punishment. (3) The green subsidy coefficient and the green degree of the product also have a greater impact on the strategic choice of the game player.