Why inconsistency arguments fail: a response to Shaw.

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Moral Philosophy
• Reproductive Rights

Background:

• Opponents of abortion often face accusations of inconsistency regarding the prevention of embryo and fetus deaths from non-induced abortion causes.
• Previous 'inconsistency arguments' have been presented as susceptible to numerous objections and broadly unsuccessful.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address Joshua Shaw's critique of previous objections to inconsistency arguments.
• To present an improved structure for inconsistency arguments, incorporating elements of Shaw's formulation.
• To re-evaluate the validity of initial objections against current inconsistency arguments.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of 'inconsistency arguments' against abortion opponents.
• Engagement with and critique of Joshua Shaw's reformulation of inconsistency arguments.
• Development of an improved inconsistency argument structure based on critical evaluation.

Main Results:

• The authors maintain that their initial objections to inconsistency arguments remain largely effective.
• While acknowledging Shaw's points on examining arguments individually, the authors refute claims of misrepresentation.
• An improved inconsistency argument structure is proposed, building upon critical engagement with counterarguments.

Conclusions:

• The authors' initial objections to inconsistency arguments are largely upheld, even after considering Shaw's critique.
• Inconsistency arguments require careful examination on a case-by-case basis.
• The effectiveness of objections to inconsistency arguments in bioethical and philosophical discourse is reaffirmed.