Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Support for Science-Tech Enterprises' Innovation with Government...

In this study, we use a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the financial support for science-tech enterprises' innovation with government participation. Based on the game model, the study uses replication dynamics to analyze the stability of evolutionary trajectory in the eight scenarios of enterprises, the government, and the financial institutes. Then, we discuss the effect of the reputation multiplier, the efficiency of firms' innovation output, and the positive socio-economic externalities multiplier by simulation as the important innovative points in this study. The study draws the following conclusions: (1) enterprises will choose high R&D intensity instead of low R&D intensity if the output of former exceeds that of the latter, (2) enterprises' R&D output is closely related to the strategy choices of the government and financial institutes, and (3) enterprises can attract government subsidy by boosting economic and social externalities. The government subsidies to enterprises with high R&D intensity will improve the innovation output by the innovation investment and reputation multiplier. So, the government can implement subsidy policy to boost high-intensive R&D activity. Financial institutes' strategy choice between equity investment and debt investment is influenced by investment yield difference and can influence enterprises' R&D intensity choices.