Qualitative properties and relations

This paper is concerned with two concepts of qualitativeness that apply to intensional entities (i.e., properties, relations, and states of affairs). I propose an account of pure qualitativeness that largely follows the traditional understanding established by Carnap, and try to shed light on its ontological presuppositions. On this account, an intensional entity is purely qualitative iff it does not 'involve' any particular (i.e., anything that is not an intensional entity). An alternative notion of qualitativeness-which I propose to refer to as a concept of strict qualitativeness-has recently been introduced by Chad Carmichael. However, Carmichael's definition presupposes a highly fine-grained conception of properties and relations. To eliminate this presupposition, I tentatively suggest a different definition that rests on a concept of perspicuous denotation. In the penultimate section, both concepts of qualitativeness are put to work in distinguishing between different 'grades' of qualitative discriminability.