Optimal decisions for green supply chain with a risk-averse retailer under government intervention

This paper investigates the effects of the financial subsidy and product access policies on the performance of green supply chains (GSCs). Based on the game theory and preference theory, we study a green supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer under government interventions from different power structures. The result reveals that green production can be effectively promoted only when product access exceeds a certain threshold. The Nash equilibrium game has the highest greenness and expected utility of GSC. It also shows that regardless of the market structure and government intervention policy, the retailer's risk aversion is positively correlated with the highest level of product access. Moreover, once effective product access is implemented, the retailer's risk aversion does not affect the optimal greenness of manufacturer production. Besides, compared with other intervention policies, the highest optimal product greenness exists in the scenario of financial subsidy with effective product access. The study suggests that the government needs to set certain green standards when implementing subsidy policies and promoting the risk aversion of retailers.