Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing

Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.