Service Sharing Decisions between Channels considering Bidirectional Free Riding Based on a Dual-Equilibrium Linkage...

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Operations Research
• Business Strategy

Background:

• Interchannel service sharing presents complex decision-making challenges for businesses.
• Understanding the dynamics of free riding and cost allocation is crucial for channel cooperation.
• Existing models may not fully capture the interplay between short-term and long-term strategies in service sharing.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a dual-equilibrium linkage model integrating static Stackelberg and dynamic evolutionary games.
• To analyze the impact of bidirectional free riding and cost-sharing proportions on service sharing decisions.
• To determine short-term equilibrium and long-term stability strategies for channel partners.

Main Methods:

• Construction of a dual-equilibrium linkage model combining static Stackelberg and dynamic evolutionary game theory.
• Analysis of the influence of free riding coefficients and cost-sharing ratios.
• Examination of equilibrium strategies under varying cost conditions.

Main Results:

• In the static Stackelberg model, decreasing service sharing costs shifts the outcome from a prisoner's dilemma to Pareto optimal cooperation.
• Under the dynamic evolutionary game, reduced offline free riding and increased cost-sharing ratios promote cooperation.
• Stability shifts from complete service competition to service sharing cooperation as parameters change.

Conclusions:

• The proposed dual-equilibrium model effectively captures the complexities of interchannel service sharing decisions.
• Cost reduction is a key driver for achieving cooperative service sharing strategies.
• The findings provide insights for optimizing channel partner relationships and maximizing mutual benefits through service sharing.