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Characterization of the Sense of Agency over the Actions of Neural-machine Interface-operated Prostheses
Published on: January 7, 2019
Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot
1Department of Philosophy, School of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281, USAbsphilli@asu.eduhttps://www.bensphillips.com/.
Abstract:
Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the "cognitive primitives" that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.
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