Judicial Discomfort over 'Innovative' Treatment for Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria

Medical treatment for adolescents with gender dysphoria has attracted considerable attention in recent years, with continuing court involvement in Australia and recent judicial review proceedings in the UK. In Re Imogen [No 6], the Family Court of Australia held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of an adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the adolescent's capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. In this article, we examine the Family Court's rationale for preserving its welfare jurisdiction in gender dysphoria cases. We analyse case law developments in Australia and more recently in the UK and identify a thread of judicial discomfort in gender dysphoria jurisprudence about adolescents consenting to medical treatment that the court perceives to be 'innovative', 'experimental', 'unique', or 'controversial'. We explore whether treatment for gender dysphoria can be characterised as 'innovative' and identify four factors that appear to be influencing courts in Australia and the UK. We also consider how such a characterisation might impact (if at all) on an adolescent's capacity to consent to gender dysphoria treatment. We critique the ongoing role of courts in these cases and recommend a robust decision-making framework for gender dysphoria treatment to minimise court involvement in the future.