Cognitive-Behavioral Differences Between Officials and Folks in China's Targeted Poverty Alleviation: An Evolutionary...

China has historically eliminated absolute poverty and built a comprehensive well-off society through targeted poverty alleviation, at the end of which, however, many issues are worthy of scholars' attention kept emerging. A significant one was cognitive-behavioral differences between officials and folks regarding the procedure, standards, and methods of removing the poverty hats, which formed a new social dilemma called the official-folk game. Officials did not carry out targeted poverty alleviation work in strict accordance with the criteria specified by the government. In comparison, folks who have reached poverty elimination standards were unwilling to take off their poverty hats after targeted assistance due to the fear of returning to poverty. To fully explain this social dilemma, this study analyzes the causes of cognitive-behavioral differences between officials and folks in China's targeted poverty alleviation from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. The results show that bounded rational officials and folks will eventually get caught up in the prisoner's dilemma without exogenous factors' intervention. Furthermore, the study proposes that the government establish reasonable punishment, incentives, and supervision mechanisms to guide officials and folks and eliminate their cognitive-behavioral differences by investigating the influence of exogenous policy factors on the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the official-folk game. This finding not only reveals the formation mechanism of the cognitive-behavioral differences between officials and folks and presents an effective solution at the individual level but also provides a reference for other developing countries to overcome similar social dilemmas in the process of eliminating absolute poverty.