Dreams of the rarebit fiend: neuromedical synthesis of unconscious meaning

A promising new "ecumenical" movement in psychiatry attempts to synthesize the two great intellectual traditions, psychoanalysis and neurobiology, so that we may avoid splitting the care of the patient into the partial domains of biotherapy that lacks the understanding of mental interrelations and purely psychological psychotherapy that lacks an appreciation of the embeddedness of mental processes in brain function. Recent synthetic work is assessed, taking as a point of departure an historic symposium in Pittsburgh, October 26-27, 1984, entitled "Neurobiology and the Unconscious: Psychoanalysis Looks Toward the Future." The means of representation of meaning (whose description was begun by Freud) in such unconscious material as dreams and folklore show the imprint of the brain function in which they are imbedded. Our afferent and efferent processes, including language, are patterned by their neuromedical basis. Linkages will be sought of representational images to visual, vestibular, and neuromotor traces: evidence that the human "thinking machine" is a very human body rather than some disembodied psychological self or computer simulation by artificial intelligence programming. Illustrative material is in part drawn from the popular dream episodes cartooned by Winsor McCay, which were considered graphic masterpieces, and incorporated representations of many normal unconscious brain mechanisms, including unusual perspectives, vestibular sensations, neuromotor inhibitions, transformations; visual and linguistic distortions, bizarre bodily intrusions, and sexual symbols. J. Allen Hobson and R.W. McCarley's 1977 arguments for the determining the significance of the pontine dream generator may have been anticipated by McCay's 1905 Dreams of the Rarebit Fiend in which, at the end of each very Freudian nightmare, the dreamer wakes and swears off eating welsh rarebits as if they caused all his unconscious images. To avoid a biological reductiveness, Freud, whom Sulloway (1983) has described as a biologist of the mind, resorted to presenting psychoanalysis as a pure psychology, not because he ever doubted the neurological imbeddedness of mind, but only because he felt medical psychoanalysts were too easily seduced and distracted by neurological mechanisms of his day to appreciate properly the importance of psychodynamics. Increasing recognition of the imbeddedness of psychoanalysis in brain function is now timely and likely, providing fresh directions for both medical psychoanalysis and the neurosciences.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)