The boundary conditions of the liking bias in moral character judgments

Recent research has shown that moral character judgments are prone to the liking bias-well-liked people are seen as morally superior to disliked or neutral ones. However, whether moral information about their past behavior would moderate the liking bias is still an open empirical question addressed in present studies. In Study 1 (N = 653), participants updated their biased moral character impressions when moral information about the target was introduced after the liking induction. In preregistered Study 2 (N = 601), when moral information about the target was presented before the liking induction, moral information had a stronger impact on moral character judgments than liking. Study 3 (N = 398) showed that moral character impression updating was three times greater when moral information was presented after (vs. before) the attitude induction. Further analyses of changes in participants' moral judgments certainty revealed that moral information reduced their uncertainty stronger than attitudes. In effect, the latter were more amenable to updating than information-based judgments. Thus, we present evidence that moral information updates moral character impressions biased by liking. Nevertheless, liking also, but to a lesser extent, updates moral character impressions initially grounded on moral information. We propose that certainty about others' moral character explains when and how moral information limits the impact of attitudinal influences on moral character judgments.