Predictive processing and perception: What does imagining have to do with it?

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Predictive processing (PP) models propose a strong unity between perception and imagination.
• PP theories suggest perception is conceptualized via imagination and shares neural implementation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the conceptual and empirical claims of PP regarding perception-imagination unity.
• To present arguments against the idea that perception and imagination are neurally identical.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of how PP links perception and imagination.
• Empirical review of clinical findings, including aphantasia, to assess neural dissociations.
• Examination of different types of mental imagery, including environment-projected imagery.

Main Results:

• PP's account of imagery is limited, neglecting environment-projected and stimulus-driven imagery.
• Clinical evidence, particularly aphantasia, demonstrates significant neural dissociations between perception and imagery.
• Perception and imagination do not necessarily share identical neural implementations.

Conclusions:

• The strong claim of perception-imagination unity in PP is conceptually and empirically flawed.
• PP theorists should reconsider or abandon their assertion of identical neural implementation for perception and imagination.
• A more nuanced understanding of the relationship between perception and imagination is needed.