A game-theoretic model of rabies in domestic dogs with multiple voluntary preventive measures

Game theory is now routinely applied to quantitatively model the decision making of individuals presented with various voluntary actions that can prevent a given disease. Most models consider only a single preventive strategy and the case where multiple preventative actions are available is severely understudied. In our paper, we consider a very simple SI compartmental model of rabies in the domestic dog population. We study two choices of the dog owners: to vaccinate their dogs or to restrict the movements of unvaccinated dogs. We analyze the relatively rich patterns of Nash equilibria (NE). We show that there is always at least one NE at which the owners utilize only one form of prevention. However, there can be up to three different NEs at the same time: two NEs at which the owners use exclusively only the vaccination or movement restriction, and the third NE when the owners use both forms of prevention simultaneously. However, we also show that, unlike the first two types of NEs, the third kind of NE is not convergent stable.