The Normativity of Law: Has the Dispositional Model Solved our Problem?

In Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, Noam Gur has presented a novel account, called the dispositional model, to explain how law bears on our normative practical reasons. Gur holds that his model is superior to the current models, namely the standard weighing model and Joseph Raz's exclusionary model. Although his work provides useful insights into the practical impact of law, I argue that: (i) his challenge against the exclusionary model is valid only insofar as one accepts Raz's normal justification thesis and dependence thesis; (ii) his argument against the weighing model misses its target, because it attacks the model as a decision-making method, not as an account of practical reason; and (iii) his dispositional model solely constitutes a decision-making strategy and does not offer a third alternative answer to the question of how law affects our normative practical reasons. Hence, the dispositional model is not a competitor to the weighing and the exclusionary model, and the problem of accounting for the normativity of law remains.