The Normativity of Law: Has the Dispositional Model Solved our Problem?

Area of Science:

• Legal Philosophy
• Moral Philosophy
• Decision Theory

Background:

• Noam Gur's "Legal Directives and Practical Reasons" introduces the dispositional model.
• This model aims to explain how legal directives influence normative practical reasons.
• Gur posits his model surpasses the standard weighing and exclusionary models.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate Gur's dispositional model of law's impact on practical reasons.
• To challenge the claimed superiority of the dispositional model over existing legal-normativity frameworks.
• To determine if the dispositional model offers a distinct theoretical contribution.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of Gur's arguments.
• Comparative critique of the dispositional, exclusionary, and weighing models.
• Examination of the conceptual underpinnings of legal normativity.

Main Results:

• Gur's critique of the exclusionary model is contingent on accepting specific Razian theses.
• Gur's critique of the weighing model mischaracterizes it as a decision-making method.
• The dispositional model is identified as a decision-making strategy, not a theory of practical reason.

Conclusions:

• The dispositional model does not present a third alternative to established models of legal normativity.
• Gur's model fails to compete with the exclusionary and weighing models.
• The fundamental problem of accounting for the normativity of law persists.