Active Interdiction Defence Scheme Against False Data-Injection Attacks: A Stackelberg Game Perspective.

Area of Science:

• Cyber-physical Systems Security
• Game Theory in Security
• Control Systems Engineering

Background:

• Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated cyber attacks, particularly false data injection (FDI).
• Existing security measures may not adequately address the strategic decision-making of attackers and defenders.
• The need for robust defense mechanisms against adversarial manipulation in CPSs is critical.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose an active interdiction defense scheme to safeguard CPSs against strategic FDI attackers.
• To model the interaction between the FDI attacker and the defense scheme using a dynamic Stackelberg game.
• To ensure the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system under attack and defense.

Main Methods:

• Formulation of a dynamic Stackelberg game framework to capture hierarchical interactions and asymmetric information.
• Construction of Stackelberg strategies for both the FDI attacker and the active interdiction defense.
• Derivation of a sufficient condition for guaranteeing the asymptotic stability of the system.

Main Results:

• The proposed active interdiction defense scheme effectively counters strategic FDI attacks.
• The dynamic Stackelberg game accurately models the interplay between attacker and defender.
• The derived condition ensures the stability of the cyber-physical system.

Conclusions:

• The active interdiction defense scheme provides a robust safeguard for CPS security against FDI attacks.
• The game-theoretic approach offers a powerful tool for analyzing and designing security strategies in CPSs.
• Simulation results validate the effectiveness and correctness of the proposed defense mechanism.