Neurobiological reduction: From cellular explanations of behavior to interventions

Scientific reductionism, the view that higher level functions can be explained by properties at some lower-level or levels, has been an assumption of nervous system analyses since the acceptance of the neuron doctrine in the late 19th century, and became a dominant experimental approach with the development of intracellular recording techniques in the mid-20th century. Subsequent refinements of electrophysiological approaches and the continual development of molecular and genetic techniques have promoted a focus on molecular and cellular mechanisms in experimental analyses and explanations of sensory, motor, and cognitive functions. Reductionist assumptions have also influenced our views of the etiology and treatment of psychopathologies, and have more recently led to claims that we can, or even should, pharmacologically enhance the normal brain. Reductionism remains an area of active debate in the philosophy of science. In neuroscience and psychology, the debate typically focuses on the mind-brain question and the mechanisms of cognition, and how or if they can be explained in neurobiological terms. However, these debates are affected by the complexity of the phenomena being considered and the difficulty of obtaining the necessary neurobiological detail. We can instead ask whether features identified in neurobiological analyses of simpler aspects in simpler nervous systems support current molecular and cellular approaches to explaining systems or behaviors. While my view is that they do not, this does not invite the opposing view prevalent in dichotomous thinking that molecular and cellular detail is irrelevant and we should focus on computations or representations. We instead need to consider how to address the long-standing dilemma of how a nervous system that ostensibly functions through discrete cell to cell communication can generate population effects across multiple spatial and temporal scales to generate behavior.