Policy-Development and Deference to Moral Experts.

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Political Science
• Public Policy

Background:

• The role of 'moral experts' (ethicists, philosophers) in policy development is often advisory and viewed as problematic.
• Challenges include skepticism about the existence and identification of moral experts.
• Democratic concerns arise if politicians excessively defer to expert moral judgments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To examine the problematic nature of moral deference in policy-making.
• To analyze and critique potential solutions to the issue of moral deference.
• To propose a framework for the appropriate involvement of moral expertise in public policy.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of moral expertise and democratic theory.
• Critique of arguments attempting to resolve the problem of moral deference.
• Examination of the principle of public reason and its implications for expert advice.

Main Results:

• Arguments that non-experts can assess moral arguments underestimate their complexity.
• The 'technical role' clarification of values by experts is insufficient due to underdetermination.
• The principle of public reason, requiring accessible justifications, limits the use of overly complex moral arguments by experts.

Conclusions:

• Moral deference to experts in policy-making poses significant challenges.
• Existing counterarguments fail to fully resolve the issue of moral deference.
• The requirement for accessible justifications within public reason effectively bars overly complex moral arguments from policy advice.