Retailer service strategy on livestreaming platforms considering free riding behavior

Livestreaming e-commerce is a significant and effective digital tool for retailers to boost sales during the COVID-19 outbreak. Services on livestreaming platforms may be provided by either the manufacturer or the retailer. As service free riding across products becomes increasingly prevalent, the key issues retailers face include selecting which product should be promoted and who should provide service on the livestreaming channel. Using a game-theoretic framework, we investigate a retailer's optimal livestreaming service strategy that considers free riding between the retailer's store brand and a manufacturer's national brand. Our main findings are as follows. When service resources on the livestreaming channel are limited, (1) the retailer should not promote products with extremely low base demand, and (2) given that the national brand is promoted, if the two brands exhibit either very similar or significantly different features, the retailer should provide service for the national brand personally; otherwise, the retailer should delegate the service to the manufacturer. When livestreaming resources are unlimited, it may be unnecessary for the retailer to promote both brands if the store brand has a large base demand.