Consciousness, (meta)cognition, and culture

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Metacognition
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Conscious experience integrates top-down (prior beliefs) and bottom-up (sensory) information.
• The weighting of these processes depends on their estimated reliability (precision).
• Metacognitive control allows flexible adjustment of these weights, influencing perception and belief.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore the role of metacognition in balancing top-down and bottom-up processing.
• To investigate the malleability of belief precision estimates at higher cognitive levels.
• To examine the influence of social and cultural factors on high-level beliefs and their precision.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of metacognitive control in cognitive hierarchies.
• Examination of the relationship between belief precision, direct experience, and social influence.
• Discussion of implications for conditions like schizophrenia and the nature of cultural beliefs.

Main Results:

• Metacognitive adjustments to belief and sensation weighting are possible but can have costs (e.g., hallucinations in schizophrenia).
• At higher cognitive levels, belief precision estimates are more uncertain and malleable.
• Confidence in abstract beliefs is significantly influenced by cultural and social information, often outweighing direct personal experience.

Conclusions:

• Metacognition enables conscious control over belief formation and perception, with significant implications for mental health.
• Cultural and social learning play a crucial role in shaping our confidence in abstract beliefs, potentially at the expense of empirical evidence.
• Understanding the interplay between personal experience, metacognition, and cultural influence is key to understanding conscious belief.