Aggregated Power Indices for Measuring Indirect Control in Complex Corporate Networks with Float Shareholders

Area of Science:

• * Corporate Finance
• * Game Theory
• * Network Analysis

Background:

• * Measuring indirect corporate control in complex shareholding structures is challenging.
• * Existing power indices may not fully capture the nuances of mutual shareholding networks with cycles.
• * Float shareholders represent an uncertain element in control dynamics.

Purpose of the Study:

• * To develop new methods for measuring the indirect control power of firms.
• * To utilize cooperative game theory's power indices within complex corporate structures.
• * To model the behavior of float shareholders using fuzzy numbers.

Main Methods:

• * Adaptation of Karos and Peters' (2015) framework by substituting the Shapley and Shubik power index.
• * Introduction of ten alternative power indices in a modular fashion.
• * Development of new 'aggregated indices' to represent firm control.
• * Modeling float shareholder behavior using Z-fuzzy numbers.

Main Results:

• * The proposed aggregated indices provide varied perspectives on coalitional strength.
• * The inclusion of Z-fuzzy numbers offers a novel way to handle shareholder uncertainty.
• * The new methods are demonstrated through a practical example.

Conclusions:

• * The developed aggregated indices offer a more comprehensive assessment of indirect control.
• * Fuzzy number modeling enhances the analysis of float shareholder influence.
• * These methods provide valuable tools for understanding complex corporate networks.