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Updated: Aug 4, 2025

Characterization of the Sense of Agency over the Actions of Neural-machine Interface-operated Prostheses
Published on: January 7, 2019
Social robots and the intentional stance
Walter Veit1, Heather Browning2
1School of History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia wrwveit@gmail.com; https://walterveit.com/.
Abstract:
Why is it that people simultaneously treat social robots as mere designed artefacts, yet show willingness to interact with them as if they were real agents? Here, we argue that Dennett's distinction between the intentional stance and the design stance can help us to resolve this puzzle, allowing us to further our understanding of social robots as interactive depictions.
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