Decentralized multi-agent collaborative innovation platform for new energy vehicle core technology breakthrough with...

Under the background of digital economy and energy crisis, based on the theory of digital empowerment and prospect theory, aiming at the problems of inefficient collaborative innovation mode, long principal-agent chain, imperfect collaborative innovation mechanism and insufficient digital collaborative innovation degree of the core technology of new energy vehicles, this study constructs a decentralized multi-agent collaborative tripartite evolutionary game model with the participation of government building platform, new energy enterprises and academic research institutions, analyzes the evolution law and key factors, and finally compares the examples of the United States, China and European countries. Results show that: (1) Government subsidies should meet the sum of the strategic income difference and the credibility income is greater than the subsidies to enterprises and research institutions; (2) The subsidy structure and innovation performance show an inverted U-shaped structure. The management mechanism of platform should be optimized; (3) Government should improve the threshold for innovators to enter the decentralized new energy vehicle core technology breakthrough platform, and the contract maintenance strength is conducive; (4) The innovation subject has a dynamic income cost distribution coefficient, and reasonable control of the income and cost sharing coefficient is important; (5) Digital empowerment can make the above four mechanisms achieve dynamic optimization iteration and achieve better equilibrium solutions. Finally, practical countermeasures for the government are put forward, which improves the theoretical research and practical exploration.