Social metacognition drives willingness to commit

Showing or telling others that we are committed to cooperate with them can boost social cooperation. But what makes us willing to signal our cooperativeness, when it is costly to do so? In two experiments, we tested the hypothesis that agents engage in social commitments if their subjective confidence in predicting the interaction partner's behavior is low. In Experiment 1 (preregistered), 48 participants played a prisoner's dilemma game where they could signal their intentions to their co-player by enduring a monetary cost. As hypothesized, low confidence in one's prediction of the co-player's intentions was associated with a higher willingness to engage in costly commitment. In Experiment 2 (31 participants), we replicate these findings and moreover provide causal evidence that experimentally lowering the predictability of others' actions (and thereby confidence in these predictions) motivates commitment decisions. Finally, across both experiments, we show that participants possess and demonstrate metacognitive access to the accuracy of their mentalizing processes. Taken together, our findings shed light on the importance of confidence representations and metacognitive processes in social interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).