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The power of the weak: When altruism is the equilibrium
1Department of Business Administration, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 8410500, Israel barkanr@bgu.ac.il; https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/fom/BusinessDep/pages/staff/RachelBarkan.aspx ylahav@bgu.ac.il; www.yaronlahav.com.
Abstract:
A rational economic analysis complements Grossmann's fearful ape hypothesis. Two examples of mixed-motive games with strong inter-dependence (i.e., weak chirping nestling, boxed pigs) demonstrate that signaling weakness is a dominant strategy. Weakness elicits cooperative, caring response, comprising the equilibrium of the game. In extensive form, a reliable reputation of weakness elicits caring as a sequential equilibrium.
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