Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind
• Experimental Psychology

Background:

• The dissociation between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness is a central, debated topic in consciousness research.
• Empirically demonstrating P-without-A consciousness is challenging because reporting an experience implies access to it.
• Previous evidence for this dissociation has been largely indirect.

Purpose of the Study:

• To experimentally investigate the potential dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness.
• To develop a novel paradigm for empirically testing P-without-A consciousness.
• To determine if phenomenal experience can exist independently of immediate reportability.

Main Methods:

• A novel experimental paradigm was designed to create conditions where participants lacked online access to stimuli.
• Participants (N=40 in Experiment 1) made retrospective judgments about the phenomenal, qualitative aspects of stimuli.
• Experiment 2 (N=40) further tested alternative explanations like unconscious processing or stimulus offset responses.

Main Results:

• Participants could form retrospective judgments on phenomenal aspects of stimuli even without online access.
• Performance could not be fully attributed to unconscious processing or stimulus offset.
• The findings suggest a potential empirical separation of phenomenal and access consciousness.

Conclusions:

• Phenomenal and access consciousness are not only conceptually distinct but may also be empirically separable.
• This study provides novel evidence supporting the dissociation between P and A consciousness.
• The findings open avenues for future research into the neural correlates of distinct conscious states.