Evolutionary game analysis for multi-level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value...

Area of Science:

• Crisis Management
• Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics

Background:

• Public participation in collaborative governance (CG) is crucial for modern emergency management systems.
• Existing research on CG primarily focuses on macro-level strategies, neglecting micro-level stakeholder behavior.
• A value perception approach is needed to understand the dynamics of multi-level emergency CG.

Purpose of the Study:

• To construct an evolutionary game model analyzing the evolution mechanism of multi-level emergency CG.
• To integrate Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting into a value perception model for optimizing game matrices.
• To investigate the impact of value perception on stakeholder behavior in emergency collaborative governance.

Main Methods:

• Development of a value perception model based on Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting.
• Analysis of evolutionary stability to determine system evolution laws.
• Numerical simulation using data from Heilongjiang province, China.

Main Results:

• The CG game system exhibits a complex evolutionary path.
• Perceived incomes and costs significantly influence the behavior of game players.
• Stakeholders demonstrate greater sensitivity to the risk aversion of cost accounts than income accounts.
• Improving perceived public satisfaction and government reputation aids long-term CG development.

Conclusions:

• Value perception is a key factor in the effective implementation of emergency collaborative governance.
• Understanding stakeholder value perception offers new insights for advancing CG in China and globally.
• The study provides a micro-level behavioral strategy framework for emergency CG.