Double-donor surrogacy and the intention to parent

Area of Science:

• Reproductive Medicine
• Bioethics
• Family Law

Background:

• Assisted reproduction frequently involves third-party donors (eggs, sperm, mitochondria) and surrogates.
• Existing surrogacy arrangements typically maintain a biological link between the child and at least one intended parent.
• This biological connection is absent in double-donor surrogacy (DDS), where both egg and sperm are donated.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate proposals for legalizing double-donor surrogacy (DDS) in the United Kingdom.
• To examine the intentionalist justification for differentiating DDS from private adoption on moral and legal grounds.
• To explore alternative frameworks for establishing moral parenthood in the context of DDS.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of existing ethical and legal arguments concerning assisted reproduction and surrogacy.
• Examination of the intentionalist theory of parenthood.
• Comparative legal and ethical assessment of double-donor surrogacy and private adoption.

Main Results:

• The intentionalist approach fails to provide a plausible justification for treating DDS distinctly from private adoption.
• Arguments based on parental intention are insufficient to establish unique moral or legal standing for DDS arrangements.
• Alternative theories of moral parenthood are also unlikely to support a clear distinction between DDS and adoption.

Conclusions:

• Current justifications for permitting DDS while distinguishing it from adoption are ethically and legally unsound.
• The absence of a biological link in DDS challenges traditional notions of parenthood and legal recognition.
• Further ethical and legal deliberation is required to establish equitable frameworks for all forms of assisted reproduction and family formation.