Heterogeneous contributions can jeopardize cooperation in the public goods game

Area of Science:

• Social Dilemma Games
• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Agent-Based Modeling

Background:

• General heterogeneity often enhances cooperation in social dilemma games.
• The specific impact of heterogeneity in contribution value remains less understood.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how heterogeneity in contribution values affects cooperation in public goods games.
• To determine the conditions under which contribution heterogeneity jeopardizes cooperation.

Main Methods:

• Agent-based modeling using Monte Carlo simulations.
• Examination of various initial distributions of contribution values.
• Analysis across different lattice structures and neighborhood definitions (e.g., square lattice with von Neumann neighborhood).

Main Results:

• Heterogeneity in contribution value can undermine cooperation, contrary to general heterogeneity effects.
• An optimal contribution value exists in homogeneous scenarios, varying by lattice type.
• In heterogeneous settings, high contributors can exploit low contributors, enabling their survival in certain parameter regions.
• This detrimental effect is pronounced in square lattices with von Neumann neighborhoods.

Conclusions:

• Contribution value heterogeneity poses a significant threat to cooperation in public goods games.
• The spatial structure (lattice type and neighborhood) critically influences the impact of contribution heterogeneity.
• Cooperation dynamics are sensitive to the interplay between strategy and contribution value, with potential for parasitic behaviors to emerge.