Evolutionary game analysis of indoor radon mitigation with local government involvement

Radon is the second leading risk factor for lung cancer after smoking. As a public policy, radon mitigation not only involves radon control technology or its cost-benefit analysis, but also includes the decision-making process of local governments. In this study, the evolutionary game theory was used to analyse the interaction between local governments and residents based on the subsidy of the central government. Considering the practical data in China, factors influencing the behaviour of local governments and residents were discussed using numerical simulations. The results indicated that radon mitigation is a fully government-promoted action; thus, its implementation largely depends on the subsidy of the central government and the share of radon control costs borne by the local government. The financial burden for both local governments and residents is a more important determinant than long-term health effects. The relatively poor local economic situation could limit the implementation of radon control. There would be a public policy paradox wherein cities or regions with higher radon risk would have lower willingness for radon control, mainly due to the significantly higher costs of radon control. This work provides reference data for decision-making to implement radon control and is expected to offer some suggestions for local governments.