Research on panic spread and decision behaviour in a delayed SEIR evolutionary game model under an emergency

Taking major emergencies as the research background, the transmission mechanism for panic spread and the decision behaviour of the opinion field are explored in this paper. By using evolutionary game theory to explore the game relationship between the official opinion field and the public opinion field and by considering the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group, the dependence coefficient is introduced to improve replicator dynamics. The dynamic delayed SEIR evolutionary game model is built by combining the epidemic model with the delay effect within the group, and the stability of the proposed model is analysed. The research results show that the strategy dependency among the same game group has positive and negative effects on the evolution process. The evolution of the dynamic delayed panic SEIR evolutionary game spread model under the effect of a positive effect is simulated. The results suggest that the official opinion field and the public opinion field should actively deal with emergencies, formulate effective control strategies to make the panic within the group disappear, and provide theoretical guidance for the relevant government to formulate plans.